LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELLPDF电子书下载

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Chapter One.Introduction 1

Chapter Two.An Introduction to Price Theory 6

A.Demand, Supply and Market Equilibrium 6

1.Demand 6

2.Supply 10

3.Market Equilibrium 13

B.Elasticity 15

1.Generally 15

2.Incidence Analysis 17

C.Perfect and Imperfect Markets 20

D.Marginal Analysis Generally 25

Chapter Three.Terms and Controver-sies in Law and Economics 27

A.Efficiency 27

1.Allocative Efficiency 28

2.Pareto Optimality and Superiority 30

3.Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 33

B.Rational Maximizer of Self-Interest 36

C.Choices and Preferences 38

1.The Wealth Effect 38

C.Choices and Preferences—Continued 40

2. Framing Problems 40

3. False Consciousness 41

D.Externalities 42

1. Negative Externalities and Property Rights 42

a.Negative Externalities 42

b.The Tragedy of the Commons 42

c.The Prisoner’s Dilemma 43

2. PositiveExternalities,Free-Riding and Public Goods 45

a.Positive Externalities 45

b.Free Riding 46

c.Public Goods 47

E.Complications 49

1. Lexical Ordering 50

2. Exogenous and Endogenous Effects 52

3. The Theory of Second Best 53

Chapter Four.The Coase Theorem and Related Property Issues 56

A.The Coase Theorem 56

1. Allocative Implications 56

2. Assignment of Rights and Distribu…tive Effects 60

3. Transaction Costs 62

B.Bargaining Problems 64

C.The Wealth Effect 67

D.Reactions to Transaction Costs 70

1. Duplicating Friction-Free Exchanges 70

2. Asymmetrical Transaction Costs 75

E.Protecting Entitlements 76

Chapter Five.Contract Law Applica-tions 82

A.Contract Law: Theory and Economic Goals 82

1. Exchange, the Contract Curve and Pareto Efficiency 82

2. Why Does Contract Law Exist? 89

3. Contract Formation and Private Risk Allocation 91

4. The Economic Goals of Contract Law 92

B.Contract Formation 93

1. Capacity 94

2. Duress 97

3. Offer and Acceptance and Other For-malities 99

4. The Consideration Requirement 101

a.Adequacy of Consideration 102

b.Nominal Consideration 103

c.Gratuitous Promises 104

d.Contract Modification 109

C.Contract Law and Distributive Goals 109

1. Exculpatory Provisions 112

2. Unconscionability 118

D.Contract Remedies 126

1. The Efficient Breach 126

2. Specific Performance 130

3. Liquidated Damages 133

4. The Lost Volume Seller 135

E.Excuses for Non-Performance 138

Chapter Six.Economics of Tort Law 142

A.The Costs of Accidents and the Economics of Tort Law 143

B. Liability,the Assignment of Rights and Externalities 145

C.The Negligence Standard 149

1. The Hand Formula 149

2. Distributive Consequences 150

D.Refining the Negligence Model: Contribu-tory Negligence 151

1. The Conventional Doctrine 151

2. Reconciling Contributory Negligence and Efficiency 152

E. Refining the Negligence Standard: Com-parative Negligence 154

1. Apportioned Comparative Negligence 155

2. Nonapportioned Comparative Negli-gence 158

F. Assumption of the Risk 159

G. Strict Liability 160

1. Efficiency and Strict Liability 161

2. Risk-Aversion and Loss Spreading 165

3. Duty to Rescue 171

4. Defenses to Strict Liability 172

a.Unforeseeable Misuse 173

b. Unreasonable Assumption of Risk 174

c. Contributory and Comparative Negligence 174

H.Damages 175

1. The Collateral Source Rule 176

2. Future Losses 176

3. Punitive Damages 181

Chapter Seven.The Economics of Anti-trust 183

A. The Competitive Extremes of Perfect Competition and Monopoly 184

1. Demand and Supply 184

2. Market Equilibrium, Producer and Consumer Surplus 189

3. The Individual Firm Under Perfect Competition: The Marginal Cost=Marginal Revenue Rule 193

4. Cost Curves 195

5. Equilibrium and Perfect Competition 199

6. Monopoly 202

7. Perfect Competition and Monopoly Compared 204

8. Some Limits on the Comparison 207

B. Market Power and Market Definition 210

1. Market Power 210

2. The Lerner Index 211

3. The Determinants of Market Power 212

4. Market Definition and Cross-Elastici-ty 213

5. Geographic Markets 215

6. Supply Elasticity 216

Chapter Eight.The Economics of Gov-ernment Regulation 219

A. The Natural Monopoly Rationale 220

1. The Theory of Natural Monopoly 220

2. Agency Regulation 224

a. Revenue Requirement 224

b. Rate Regulation 227

c. Cross-Subsidization 232

3. Contestable Markets 235

B. Excessive Competition 236

C. The Allocation of Inherently Scarce Re-sources 240

D. Reactions to Transaction Costs and Exter-nalities 242

1. Rationalizing an Industry 244

2. Increasing the Availability of Infor-mation 245

3. Reactions to Externalities 249

Chapter Nine.Public Choice 257

A. Why Have a Government? 258

B. Approaches to Government 263

1. Utilitarianism 263

2. Rawls’ Theory of Justice 266

C.Why Vote at All? 268

D. Problems of Ascertaining Preferences Through Voting 270

1. Unanimity and Majority Voting 270

2. Arrow’s Theorem and Possible Solu-tions 274

a. Logrolling 279

b. Single-Peaked Preferences 280

E. The Economic Theory of Legislation 281

1. What Do Legislators Want? 281

2. Interest Groups 284

3. The Market for Legislation 286

INDEX 291

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