GAMES AND INFORMATION AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY SECOND EDITIONPDF电子书下载

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Introduction 1

History 1

Game Theory’s Method 2

Exemp 2

fying Theory 2

This Book’s Style 4

Notes 6

PART Ⅰ GAME THEORY 7

1 The Rules of the Game 9

1.1 Basic Definitions 9

1.2 Dominant Strategies:The Prisoner’s Dilemma 16

1.3 Iterated Dominance:Battle of Bismarck Sea 19

1.4 Nash Equilibrium:Boxed Pigs,Battle of the Sexes,and Ranked Coordination 22

1.5 Focal Points 28

Notes 29

Problems 32

2 Information 35

2.1 Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game 35

2.2 Information Sets 40

2.3 Perfect,Certain,Symmetric,and Complete Information 45

2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games 48

2.5 Example:The Png Settlement Game 57

Notes 62

Problems 63

3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies 67

3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game 67

3.2 Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies 72

3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game 77

3.4 Randomizing versus Mixing: The Auditing Game 81

3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game 83

Notes 86

Problems 89

4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information 93

4.1 Subgame Perfectness 93

4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I 96

4.3 Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits 98

4.4 Recoordination of Pareto-Dominant Equilibria in Subgames:Pareto Perfection 106

4.5 Discounting 108

4.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game 110

Notes 115

Problems 116

5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information 121

5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox 121

5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments and the Folk Theorem 123

5.3 Reputation: The One-Sided Prisoner’s Dilemma 129

5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game 131

5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in the Game of Customer Switching Costs 135

Notes 137

Problems 140

6 Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information 143

6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence Ⅱ and Ⅲ 143

6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: The PhD Admissions Game 148

6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence Ⅳ and Ⅴ 152

6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma:The Gang of Four Model 154

6.5 The Axelrod Tournament 156

Notes 158

Problems 159

PART Ⅱ ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 163

7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions 165

7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models 165

7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game 169

7.3 Finding Optimal Contracts:The Three-Step Procedure and the Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints 175

7.4 Optimal Contracts:The Broadway Game 177

7.5 State-Space Diagrams:Insurance Games I and Ⅱ 182

Notes 187

Problems 191

8 Topics in Moral Hazard 195

8.1 Pooling versus Separating Equilibria and the Revelation Principle 195

8.2 An Example of Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge:The Salesman Game 199

8.3 Renegotiation of Contracts:The Repossession Game 203

8.4 Efficiency Wages 206

8.5 Tournaments 207

8.6 Institutions and Agency Problems 209

8.7 Teams 213

Notes 216

Problems 219

9 Adverse Selection 223

9.1 Introduction:Production Game ⅦII 223

9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty:Lemons I and II 224

9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes:Lemons III and IⅣ 228

9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty:Insurance Game Ⅲ 231

9.5 Other Equilibrium Concepts:Wilson Equilibrium and Reactive Equilibrium 235

9.6 The Groves Mechanism 237

9.7 A Variety of Applications 239

Notes 242

Problems 245

10 Signalling 249

10.1 The Informed Player Moves First:Signalling 249

10.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education 253

10.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education 257

10.4 The Informed Player Moves Second:Screening 259

10.5 Two Signals:The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues 265

Notes 269

Problems 270

PART Ⅲ APPLICATIONS 273

11 Bargaining 275

11.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem:Splitting a Pie 275

11.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution 276

11.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time 279

11.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time 281

11.5 Incomplete Information 284

Notes 289

Problems 290

12 Auctions 293

12.1 Auction Classification and Private-Value Strategies 293

12.2 Comparing Auction Rules 298

12.3 Common-Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse 300

12.4 Information in Common-Value Auctions 303

Notes 304

Problems 306

13 Pricing 309

13.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited 309

13.2 Prices as Strategies: Bertrand Equilibrium 314

13.3 Location Models 319

13.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games 325

13.5 Durable Monopoly 330

Notes 335

Problems 338

14 Entry 341

14.1 Innovation and Patent Races 341

14.2 Signal Jamming 348

14.3 Predatory Pricing: The Kreps-Wilson Model 352

14.4 Entry for Buyout 355

Notes 359

15 The New Industrial Organization 361

15.1 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model 361

15.2 Takeovers and Greenmail 364

15.3 Market Microstructure 369

15.4 Rate of Return Regulation and Government Procurement 373

Appendix A: Answers to Odd-Numbered Problems 381

Appendix B: Mathematics 429

Notation 429

Glossary 433

Risk 436

Supermodularity 439

References and Name Index 441

Index 443

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