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1 Consent in the Law： A Preliminary Examination 1

Ⅰ Introduction 1

Ⅱ What is there to Understand about Consent？ 4

（Ⅰ） The Function of Consent 5

（Ⅱ） The Conditions for Giving a Valid Consent 7

（Ⅲ） The Capacity （and Competence） to Consent 12

（Ⅳ） Does it Matter Who Gives Gonsent （including by proxy） and to Whom it is Given？ 14

（Ⅴ） The Necessity， Sufficiency， and Fustifying Limits of Consent 15

（Ⅵ） The Signalling of Consent 19

（Ⅶ） The Scope and Interpretation of Consent 22

（Ⅷ） Withdrawal of Consent 23

（Ⅸ） Refusal of Consent 25

Ⅲ Mapping the Ethics of Consent 27

（Ⅰ） A Utilitarian Approach and Consent 27

（Ⅱ） A Rights-led Approach （under a Will Theory of Rights） and Consent 29

（Ⅲ） A Duty-led Approach and Consent 31

Ⅳ The Purpose and Plan of the Book 32

Coda 34

PART ONE： A GEWIRTHIAN APPROACH TO CONSENT IN THE LAW 39

2 The Principle of Generic Consistency： Its Justification and Application 39

Ⅰ Introduction 39

Ⅱ The PGC 39

Ⅲ Why Employ the PGC？ 41

（Ⅰ） The Dialectically Necessary Argument 41

（Ⅱ） An Alternative Presentation of this Argument 43

（Ⅲ） Deriving Acceptance of the PGC from the Acceptance of Morality 44

（Ⅳ） The Dialectically Contingent Argument from the Acceptance of Human Rights 46

（Ⅴ） The Dialectically Contingent Argument from Impartial Rationality 50

Ⅳ Applying the PGC 51

（Ⅰ） Empirical Specification of the Generic Conditions 51

（Ⅱ） fudging Agency （Precaution under a Categorical Imperative） 52

（Ⅲ） Direct and Indirect Applications 55

3 The Functions of Consent in the Law 59

Ⅰ Introduction 59

Ⅱ Consent as a Procedural Justification 61

Ⅲ Hohfeldian Analysis and Consent 64

（Ⅰ） A has a Right； B has a Duty 65

（Ⅱ） A has a Privilege； B has a No-right 66

（Ⅲ） A has a Power； B has a Liability 69

（a） Powers with a Right/Duty Baseline 70

（b） Powers with a Privilege/No-right Baseline 71

（Ⅳ） A has an Immunity； B has a Disability 74

Ⅳ The Consent Proviso 74

（Ⅰ） A has a Right； B has a Duty 75

（Ⅱ） A has a Privilege； B has a No-right 76

（Ⅲ） A has a Power； B has a Liability 79

（Ⅳ） A has an Immunity； B has a Disability 80

（Ⅴ） Summary 80

Ⅴ The Functions of Consent in the Law： A Working Model 81

（Ⅰ） Changes Internal to a Relationship 81

（Ⅱ） Changes that Create a Legal Relationship 82

（Ⅲ） A Working Model of the Functions of Consent in the Law 83

Ⅵ The Consent Proviso and the Gewirthian Will Theory of Rights 85

ⅦThe Agenda for Discussion 88

PART TWO： CONSENT IN THE LAW Ⅰ：QUESTIONS OF ADEQUACY 93

4 Subjects of Consent： Questions of Capacity and Competence 93

Ⅰ Introduction 93

Ⅱ Identifying Subjects of Consent 98

（Ⅰ） The Ideal-typical Subject of Consent 98

（Ⅱ） Subjects of Consent Viewed under the Precautionary Principle 101

（a） Protection under Precaution 101

（b） Beneficiaries of Precaution 104

（c） Intermittent Agents 108

（d） Task Competence 110

（Ⅲ） When does one Become a Subject of Consent？ The Question of Age Limits 111

Ⅲ Dealing with Non-ideal-typical Subjects of Consent 114

（Ⅰ） Substituted Fudgement： the Case of Ferry Strunk 114

（Ⅱ） Best Interests 117

（Ⅲ） Proxies 119

（Ⅳ） Dealing with the Dead 121

（Ⅴ） Fustifying Actions Without Consent 123

Ⅳ Conclusion 123

5 The Conditions of （Valid） Consent Ⅰ： Unforced and Informed Choice 125

Ⅰ Introduction 125

Ⅱ A Gewirthian Approach to the Conditions of Consent 127

Ⅲ Consent： The Pivotal Conditions 130

（Ⅰ） Unforced Choice 131

（a） What Counts as External Force？ 133

（b） Unforced Choice， Involuntary Action， and Acting against one’s Will 138

（c） Limited Choice 143

（Ⅱ） Knowledge and Understanding 145

Ⅳ Conclusion 153

6 The Conditions of Consent Ⅱ： Duress， Undue Influence， and Disclosure 155

Ⅰ Introduction 155

Ⅱ Free Choice， Economic Duress， and Undue Influence 156

（Ⅰ） Duress 159

（Ⅱ） Undue Influence 165

Ⅲ Informed Consent and Disclosure 170

Ⅳ Conclusion 183

7 Questions of Signalling and Scope， Withdrawal， and Refusal 187

Ⅰ Introduction 187

Ⅱ The Signalling of Consent 188

（Ⅰ） The Subjective Test 190

（Ⅱ） Signalling in Person 197

（Ⅲ） Distinct and Definite Signalling 199

（Ⅳ） Unequivocal Signal 205

（Ⅴ） Ex Ante 207

（Ⅵ） The Timing of Consent and the Proviso re Delay 208

（a） Where a Change of Mind is Permitted 209

（b） Where a Change of Mind is not Permitted 211

（Ⅶ） Taking Stock 212

Ⅲ The Scope and Interpretation of Consent 212

Ⅳ Withdrawal and Refusal of Consent 221

（Ⅰ） Withdrawal of Consent 221

（a） Withdrawal in relation to an Agreed Change of Position 222

（b） Withdrawal in relation to the Consensual Creation of a New Relationship 223

（Ⅱ） Refusal 225

Ⅴ Conclusion 226

PART THREE： CONSENT IN THE LAW Ⅱ：QUESTIONS OF NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY 231

8 The Necessity， Sufficiency， and Relevance of Consent Ⅰ： Private Wrong and Private Empowerment 231

Ⅰ Introduction 231

Ⅱ Private Wrong： The Necessity and Sufficiency of Consent：Some Groundwork 232

Ⅱ Private Wrong： The Necessity and Sufficiency of Consent as a Relevant Justificatory Condition 237

（Ⅰ） Viewing Consent from a Gewirthian Perspective 240

（Ⅱ） One Aspect of the Fallacy of Necessity： Without Consent there is a Wrong 242

（Ⅲ） Commercial Exploitation Without Consent 243

（Ⅳ） Defences to Private Wrong and a Second Aspect of the Fallacy of Necessity 252

（Ⅴ） The Sufficiency of Consent 256

Ⅳ Private Empowerment： The Necessity and Sufficiency of Consent as a Relevant Justificatory Condition 257

（Ⅰ） The Necessity of Consent 259

（Ⅱ） The Sufficiency of Consent 264

Ⅴ Conclusion 267

9 The Necessity， Sufficiency， and Relevance of Consent Ⅱ：Public Wrong 269

Ⅰ Introduction 269

Ⅱ Public Wrong and the Sufficiency of Consent 270

（Ⅰ） Autonomy-limitation Ⅰ： The Regulation of Assisted Suicide and Homosexuality 272

（a） Assisted Suicide 273

（b） Homosexuality 285

（Ⅱ） Autonomy-limitation Ⅱ： The Regulation of Access to Reproductive Technologies 291

（Ⅲ） Taking Stock 297

Ⅲ Non-consensual Justifications and Excuses 297

Ⅳ Conclusion 303

PART FOUR： CONSENT AS THE BASIS OF LEGAL （POLITICAL） AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 307

10 Consent and the Stability and Authority of Law 307

Ⅰ Introduction 307

Ⅱ Law’s Claim to Authority 311

Ⅲ The Internal Problem of Authority 316

Ⅳ The External Problem of Authority 323

Ⅴ Conclusion 330

11 Consent as Procedural Justification： Concluding Remarks 333

Ⅰ Introduction 333

Ⅱ Methodology 334

Ⅲ The Functions of Consent 335

Ⅳ From a Simple Community of Rights to a Legal Community of Rights 338

Ⅴ Who can Consent？ 342

Ⅵ Disentangling the Requirements of an Adequate Consent 343

（Ⅰ） Signalling 343

（Ⅱ） Unforced Choice 345

（Ⅲ） Informed Choice 347

（Ⅳ） Interpretation 349

（Ⅴ） Taking Stock 350

Ⅶ Relative Autonomy 351

Ⅷ The Justificatory Power and Province of Consent 355

（Ⅰ） The Fallacy of Necessity 355

（Ⅱ） The Fallacy of Sufficiency 356

Ⅸ Legitimation and Legitimacy 357

Ⅹ ‘Governance by Consent’ and the Authority of the Law 359

Ⅺ Law and Consent in the Global Order after 9/11 361

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