THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS A PRIMERPDF电子书下载

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1 Introduction 1

1.1 The Great Families of Models 3

1.2 The Principal-Agent Model 4

1.3 Overview of the Book 6

References 8

2 Adverse Selection: General Theory 11

2.1 Mechanism Design 13

2.1.1 General Mechanisms 15

2.1.2 Application to Adverse Selection Models 16

2.2 A Discrete Model of Price Discrimination 18

2.2.1 The Consumer 18

2.2.2 The Seller 19

2.2.3 The First-Best: Perfect Discrimination 19

2.2.4 Imperfect Information 21

2.3 The Standard Model 26

2.3.1 Analysis of the Incentive Constraints 28

2.3.2 Solving the Model 32

Exercises 39

References 40

3 Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions 41

3.1 Examples of Applications 41

3.1.1 Regulating a Firm 41

3.1.2 Optimal Taxation 43

3.1.3 The Insurer as a Monopolist 47

3.1.4 Implicit Contracts 52

3.2 Extensions 59

3.2.1 Competition in Contracts 59

3.2.2 The Theory of Auctions 65

3.2.3 Risk-Averse Agents 71

3.2.4 Multidimensional Characteristics 73

3.2.5 Robustness and Observation Errors 74

3.2.6 Bilateral Private Information 75

3.2.7 Countervailing Incentives 78

Exercises 79

References 81

4 Signaling Models 85

4.1 The Market for Second-hand Cars 86

4.2 Costly Signals 87

4.2.1 Separating Equilibria 90

4.2.2 Pooling Equilibria 90

4.2.3 The Selection of an Equilibrium 92

4.3 Costless Signals 95

4.3.1 A Simple Example 95

4.3.2 The General Model 97

4.4 Other Examples 101

4.5 The Informed Principal 103

Exercises 104

References 105

5 Moral Hazard 107

5.1 A Simple Example 110

5.2 The Standard Model 112

5.2.1 The Agent's Program 113

5.2.2 The Principal's Program 114

5.2.3 Properties of the Optimal Contract 117

5.3 Extensions 123

5.3.1 Informativeness and Second-Best Loss 123

5.3.2 A Continuum of Actions 124

5.3.3 An Infinity of Outcomes 125

5.3.4 The Multisignal Case 126

5.3.5 Models with Several Agents 127

5.3.6 The Robustness of Contracts 128

5.3.7 The Multitask Model 130

5.4 Examples of Applications 134

5.4.1 Insurance 134

5.4.2 Wage Determination 136

Exercises 140

References 141

6 The Dynamics of Complete Contracts 143

6.1 Commitment and Renegotiation 144

6.2 Strategic Commitment 146

6.3 What Are Complete Contracts? 150

6.4 Adverse Selection 151

6.4.1 Full Commitment 152

6.4.2 Long-Term Commitment 154

6.4.3 No Commitment 158

6.4.4 Short-Term Commitment 159

6.4.5 Conclusion 160

6.5 Moral Hazard 160

6.5.1 Renegotiation after Effort 161

6.5.2 Convergence to the First-Best 163

6.5.3 Finitely Repeated Moral Hazard 165

References 172

7 Incomplete Contracts 175

7.1 Observable but Nonverifiable Effort 177

7.2 Property and Residual Control Rights 179

7.3 Contract Incompleteness and Underinvestment 184

7.4 Concluding Remarks 187

References 188

8 Some Empirical Work 191

8.1 Adverse Selection Models 192

8.1.1 The Standard Model 192

8.1.2 Models of Auctions 195

8.2 Moral Hazard Models 199

8.2.1 Using Dynamics 200

8.2.2 Exploiting Insurance Data 201

8.3 Conclusion 202

References 203

Appendix: Some Noncooperative Game Theory 205

A.1 Games of Perfect Information 206

A.1.1 Nash Equilibrium 206

A.1.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium 206

A.2 Games of Incomplete Information 208

A.2.1 Bayesian Equilibrium 208

A.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 209

A.2.3 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 211

References 214

Index 215

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