THE LAW AND THE RIGHT A REAPPRAISAL OF THE REALITY THAT OUGHT TO BEPDF电子书下载

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Part One - The Reality That Ought to Be:Problems and Critical Issues 1

Chapter 1 - A First Glance 3

1.1.The Reality That Ought to Be as Opposed to the Reality That Is 3

1.2.The Law and the Right.What Is Objectively Right and What Is Subjectively Right 5

1.3.What Is Objectively Right as the Content of Norms.Four Meanings of “Right” 9

Chapter 2 - Dualism and Interaction between the Reality That Ought to Be and the Reality That Is:Validity as a Pineal Gland 13

2.1.Constitutive Types and Valid Tokens as Independent of Norms 13

2.1.1.Validity as Congruence 13

2.1.2.Some People Speak of Types.The So-called Typicality of Law 15

2.1.3.Other People Presuppose Types 17

2.1.4.Types Are Constitutive, Rules Are Regulative 18

2.1.5.Simple and Compound Types and Tokens 20

2.1.6.Competence, or Capacity 21

2.2.The Chain of Normative Production.The So-called Typicality of Law 22

2.2.1.The Primacy of the Reality That Ought to Be 22

2.2.2.Valid and Invalid Behaviours 24

2.2.2.1.Noblesse Oblige 24

2.2.2.2.Four Possibilities 27

2.2.3.Ought-Effects Are neither Valid nor Invalid 32

Chapter 3 - Taking a Dive into the Sources of Law 35

3.1.Where to Jump in From 35

3.2.Facts, Acts, and Transactions as Valid Is-Events Which Cause Ought-Effects in What Is Subjectively Right 35

3.2.1.Generalia 35

3.2.2.Is-Facts Strictly Understood 36

3.2.3.Is-Acts Strictly Understood 37

3.2.4.Transactions, or Declarations of Will 38

3.3.Distinguishing Ought-Effects in What Is Subjectively Right from Ought-Effects in What Is Objectively Right 39

3.4.Sources of Law as Valid Is-Events （Facts, Acts,and Declarations of Will） Which Cause Ought-Effects in What Is Objectively Right 41

3.5.Sources of Law as Ought-Effects （in What Is Objectively Right） Caused by Sources of Law as Valid Is-Events 43

3.6.The Sovereign Normative Will as the Source of Positive Law in the Natural-Law School and in German Legal Positivism Alike 47

3.6.1.Two Glorious Examples 47

3.6.2.The State of Nature and the Promise 48

3.6.3.What Divides and What Unites the Natural-Law School and German Legal Positivism 51

Chapter 4 - The Problem of the Matrix 57

4.1.The Matrix of Normativeness as the Ultimate Source of What Is Right by Virtue of Human-Posited Norms 57

4.2.A Problem of Authenticity 61

4.2.1.Orthogonal Norms and Straight Rules 61

4.2.2.A Few Qualifying Remarks 64

4.2.3.Umm al-Kitab: The Mother of the Book, or the Matrix of the Koran 66

4.2.4.The Great-Grandmother of Positive Human Law 69

4.3.Nature as the Matrix of Normativeness 70

4.3.1.A Traditional Starting Point 70

4.3.2.Nature as the Will of God 74

4.3.3.Nature as Biological Instinct 75

4.3.4.Nature as Divine and Human Reason 77

4.3.5.Nature as the Cosmic Order 78

4.4.The Origin of the Term Jus Positivum 80

Part Two - The Reality That Ought to Be: A Monistic Perspective.Norms as Beliefs and as Motives of Behaviour 83

Chapter 5 - The Motives of Human Behaviour 85

5.1.Summary of Part One and Brief Considerations on Some Legal-Philosophical Orientations 85

5.2.Encoding of Behaviour-Types: Human Personality and Culture 89

5.3.The Conditional Connection between Types of Action and Types of Circumstance.Habits and Practices 90

5.4.Needs, Interests, Values, and Norms 92

Chapter 6 - Norms as Beliefs 97

6.1.The Concepts of Norm and Custom 97

6.2.The Existence of a Norm Presupposes at Least One Believer （Doxia） 98

6.3.The Conditionality of the Content of a Norm:The Type of Action and the Type of Circumstance.More on What Is Objectively Right 101

6.4.The Referents of a Norm: Being a Duty-Holder （Deontia） or a Right-Holder （Exousia）.More on What Is Subjectively Right 105

6.5.The Being-in-Force of a Norm: Being a Duty-Holder and a Believer （Nomia）.The Not-Being-in-Force of a Norm:Being a Duty-Holder and a Nonbeliever （Anomia） 108

6.6.The Efficaciousness and Inefficaciousness of a Norm: Abiding and Deviant Duty-Holders.The Whited Sepulchres and the Jesuits.Efficacious Norms as a Subset of Effective Norms 109

6.7.In the Case of Anomia, a Norm Can Be either Obeyed （Conformism of Duty-Holding Nonbelievers） or Not Obeyed （Nonconformism of Duty-Holding Nonbelievers）, but It Cannot Be Efficacious or Inefficacious 112

6.8.Practising Duty-Holders and Non-Practising Duty-Holders 113

Chapter 7 - How Norms Proliferate in Human Brains 115

7.1.Subsuming Valid Tokens under a Type of Circumstance and Producing Derivative Norms from the Type of Action Conditionally Connected with the Type of Circumstance 115

7.2.Proliferation from Norms of Conduct.Static Systems and Dynamic Systems 117

7.3.Proliferation from Competence Norms 123

Part Three - Family Portraits.Law as Interference in the Motives of Behaviour 129

Chapter 8 - No Law without Norms 131

8.1.Family Portraits.A Normativistic Gallery: Axel Hagerstrom,Karl Olivecrona, and H.L.A.Hart 1961 131

8.1.1.A Caution for All Visitors 131

8.1.2.A Critique of Voluntarism in Favour of Normativism 131

8.1.3.Norms versus Commands 133

8.1.3.1.Diversity among the Contextual Requirements 133

8.1.3.2.What Is Objectively Right: The Internal Point of View, a Point of View Internalised in the Brains of Believers, and Which Manifests Itself in Their Use of a Typically Normative Language 134

8.1.3.3.Universalisability of Norms （Catholodoxia） 135

8.1.3.4.Justified Reaction to Transgression （Dikedoxia） 136

8.1.4.In What Sense Can a Norm Be Said to Exist （Doxia） 137

8.1.5.Constitutional Norms （Hagerstrom and Olivecrona） and the Rule of Recognition （Hart） 139

8.1.6.Misinformation about Scandinavian Legal Realism 142

8.2.A More Targeted Reckoning with “Validity” in Legal Discourse 145

8.2.1.The Broad and the Narrow Sense of Competence Norms and Norms of Conduct 145

8.2.2.On the Function of a Valid Slap 146

8.2.3.The Metonymic Validity of Legal Directives and Texts of Law 147

8.2.4.The Slippery Slope of Validity.Norms Cannot Be Issued,or Enacted 149

8.2.5.Validity in Its Traditional Sense as a Source of Misguided Legal Normativism: Validity, Law in Force, and Normativeness 156

8.2.6.Going beyond Hart in Treating the Relationship between Validity and Normativeness in Law 158

8.2.6.1.Intra-Systemic Norms 158

8.2.6.2.The Difference between Criteria and Rules as a Difference between Types and Norms 166

8.3.Hart’s Postscript Compared with Hart 1961:An Abjuration of Normativeness in Law 172

8.3.1.Hart’s Masterpiece of 1961 172

8.3.2.Hart the Iconoclast: The Postscript’s Destruction of the 1961 Portrait 174

8.3.3.Summing up on Hart 1961 and on Hart’s Postscript 181

Chapter 9 - But Norms Are Not Enough.The Interaction between Language and Motives of Behaviour 187

9.1.From Norms to Propositions: The Analytical Emasculation 187

9.2.Indices, Symbols, and Conative Effects.Directives 190

9.3.Language That Bypasses the Motives of Behaviour:Suggestion and Charisma 198

9.4.Language That Overwhelms the Motives of Behaviour:Power 201

9.5.Language That Affects the Motives of Behaviour: Influence 202

9.5.1.Influence Affecting Needs, Interests, and Values 202

9.5.2.Influence Affecting Norms 203

9.6.Language That Modifies the Internalised Reality That Ought to Be: Authority （Integration between Norms and Validly Enacted Directives or Texts） 205

Chapter 10 - The Law in Force: An Ambiguous Intertwining of Normativeness and Organised Power 209

10.1.Underscoring the Role of Force in Law in order to Avoid Misunderstandings with regard to Normativism 209

10.2.The Law in Force 214

10.2.1.Orthodoxia and Catholodoxia.The Normative Social Control on Believers: Dogmas, Heterodoxia, Paradoxia,Heresy 214

10.2.2.Dikedoxia.The Normative Social Control on Duty-Holders: The Idea of Just Coercion 218

10.2.3.The Characters of the Play, the Play of Characters 222

10.2.4.Who Is to Say What Is the Law in Force: The Judges as Managers of What Is Subjectively Right （Dikaspoloi） 232

10.2.5.The Law in Force as Domination （Herrschaft） 240

10.2.6.On Authority, Autonomy, and Heteronomy 243

Part Four - In Search of Confirming Others 247

Chapter 11 - The Reality That Ought to Be as Fate 249

11.1.Consciousness of Death, Anxiety, and Self-Defensive Creation of Myth 249

11.2.Heimarmene and Moira: To Each His Own 260

11.3.The Double Conditionality of Fate.Huper Moron at the Origins of Chisholm’s Paradox 262

11.3.1.Kata Moiran: In Accordance with the Norm 262

11.3.2.The Possibility of Acting beyond the Norm:Huper Moron 263

11.3.3.The Fulfilment of the Second Condition: Huper Moron Behaviour, the Violation of the Norm.Chisholm’s Paradox 264

Chapter 12 - What Is Right in Homeric Epic 269

12.1.Homage to Eric A.Havelock 269

12.1.1.Why Havelock? 269

12.1.2.A Heresy Unaccomplished 271

12.1.3.The Anthropology of the Homeric Poems: The Didactic Function of Epic in the Oral Civilisation of the Early Greek City-States 275

12.2.A Revisitation of Homeric Dike in the Light of the Distinction among “Norms,” “What Is Objectively Right,” and “What Is Subjectively Right” 279

12.2.1.Premise 279

12.2.2.Norms and Society 280

12.2.3.Dike as What Is Objectively Right 283

12.2.4.Dikai as What Is Subjectively Right and Its Management,That Is, Dike as the Restoration of What Is Right 288

12.2.5.“Right” and “Wrong” as Adjectives Used to Qualify Things and People 292

Chapter 13 - What Is Right, What Is Just, Ratio as Type:Sanctus Thoma Docet 295

13.1.Jus in the History of the Idea of What Is Right 295

13.2.Three Senses of Quod Est Rectum, or What Is Right.Jus as What Is Right （Quod Est Rectum） toward Others 297

13.3.Jus as the Objective of Justice: Justitia Est Rectitudo Causaliter Tantum 299

13.4.The Justice of Human-Posited Norms （Justitia Legalis）Presupposes the Constant and Perpetual Just Will of the Ruler Who Has the Community in His Care 303

13.5.In What Sense Is the Justice of Human-Posited Norms （Justitia Legalis） General 306

13.6.Prudence and Justice in the Judgments That Judges Are to Pass 312

13.7.Jus （What Is Right toward Others） Is Made Right, in What Concerns Its Essence （Essentialiter）, by the Type （Ratio） Contained in a Lex （Norm） 315

13.8.The Redde Rationem （the Day of Reckoning）: Ratio as Type in the Rendition of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 324

Chapter 14 - The Law and What Is Right.Hans Kelsen under Suspicion 333

14.1.Prologue 333

14.2.Kelsen in the 1940s 333

14.3.A Few Other Contemporary English Translations of objektives Recht and subjektives Recht 336

14.4.The “Dualism” between objektives Recht and subjektives Recht:A Further Investigation into Kelsen 340

14.5.Kelsen’s Reduction of What Is Subjectively Right to What Is Objectively Right.A Textual Analysis （or Rather a Crossword Puzzle） 341

14.6.How What Is Subjectively Right, Having Been Pushed out the Front Door, Slips in through the Back Disguised as an Individualised Norm 349

Chapter 15 - Nature and Culture 355

15.1.Summing up on My Confirming Others 355

15.2.Eighteen Thousand Centuries of Culture 357

15.2.1.From Homo Habilis to Homo Sapiens Sapiens 357

15.2.2.Culture Encoded in Human Brains and Culture Inscribed in Documents and Artifacts 358

15.2.3.Types and Memory 362

15.2.4.What Is Mind? No Matter.What Is Matter? Never Mind.Social Construction of Reality and the Construction of Social Reality 365

15.2.5.Norms in the Formation of Individual Personality.Socialisation and Normative Revolution （Metanoia） 368

15.3.The Micro-Macro Link 371

15.3.1.Cognitive and Social Action: A Society of Minds 371

15.3.2.The Interaction between Social Structure and Character Structure 374

15.3.3.Norms and the Mental Implementation of a Social System 379

15.3.4.Internalising the Reality That Ought to Be:From Significant Others to the Generalised Other 384

15.4.The Palingenesy of the Psychological Aspects of the Internal Point of View.Overcoming the Analytical Paradigm: Willard Van Orman Quine, John R&Searle, and the Neurosciences 389

15.5.A Few Closing Remarks That Go Back to What Is Right and Law: What Is Right by Nature and What Is Right by Law as Cultural Products 406

Appendix - Elements for a Formalisation of the Theory of Norms Developed in This Volume （by Alberto Artosi, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, and Silvia Vida） 413

1.Preliminaries 413

2.The Definition of “Norm” 415

3.Duty-Holder （Deontia） and Right-Holder （Exousia）.The Being-in-Force and Not-Being-in-Force of a Norm.Efficaciousness and Inefficaciousness of a Norm 416

4.How Norms Proliferate in Human Minds 421

Bibliography （Compiled by Antonino Rotolo） 425

Index of Subjects 439

Index of Names 451

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