ONE Introduction 3
1. Efficiency Concepts 4
2. The Coase Theorem 7
3. Themes 10
4. Plan of the Book 11
TWO The Economics of Tort Law: The Basic Model 15
1. The Basic Accident Model 16
2. The Hand Rule and Causation 20
3. Individualized versus Average Standards: The Reasonable Person 25
4. Activity Levels and Accident Risk 27
5. Issues in the Determination of Damages 33
6. Summary 37
THREE The Economics of Tort Law: Extensions 39
1. Litigation Costs 39
2. The Impact of Uncertainty About Legal Standards, Causation,and Risk 44
3. Sequential Care Torts and Strategic Behavior 58
4. Summary 70
FOUR The Economics of Contract Law: Remedies for Breach 71
1. Court-Imposed Damage Remedies 72
2. Risk Sharing and Remedies for Breach 76
3. Asymmetric Information and Limited Liability for Breach 78
4. Liquidated Damages 83
5. Specific Performance 87
6. Summary 91
FIVE The Economics of Contract Law:Mistake,Impossibility,and Other Doctrines 92
1. Offer,Acceptance,and Consideration 93
2. Formation Defenses 93
3. Performance Excuses 101
4. Contract Modification:The Preexisting Duty Rule 107
5. Summary 114
SIX The Economics of Property Law 115
1. Property Rules and Liability Rules 116
2. Controlling Externalities:Formal Analysis 119
3. Land Transfer 127
4. Summary 136
SEVEN Government Taking and Regulation of Private Property 137
1. The Economics of Eminent Domain 137
2. Regulation and Takings 145
3. Summary 155
EIGHT The Economics of Litigation and Settlement 156
1. The Differing Perceptions Model 157
2. The Asymmetric Information Model 164
3. The Impact of Different Cost-Allocation Rules 166
4. Discovery 173
5. Application:The Decision of Repeat Defendants to Employ in-House Counsel or an Outside Attorney 178
6. Summary 180
NINE The Economics of Frivolous Litigation 181
1. The Differing Perceptions Model 182
2. The Legal Error Model 183
3. The Timing of Litigation Costs 184
4. The Asymmetric Information Model 185
5. Summary 200
Notes 201
References 220
Index 231